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Montana Perpetuities Legislation -
A Plea for Reform 1
T. L. WATERBURY*
Relatively speaking, the law of perpetuities! affects only a
handful of people, in Montana or any other state. In the main,
those affected are a few well-to-do men and women, their fam-
ilies, their favored charities and their estate planners." Does it
follow, then, that the lawyer in general practice can ignore the
subject? Surely not. Occasionally, he will be one of the estate
planners just referred to, planning for one of his best clients.
And, because he is an occasional estate planner, it will be neces-
sary for him to brush up on a number of things, including the
law of perpetuities, to do a good job. Clearly, it is of particular
importance to this lawyer that the local perpetuities law be as
complete and comprehensible as possible. Wherever he may
practice, his perpetuities refresher will be time consuming. But
if he is a Montana practitioner, and his client has long-term fam-
ily arrangements in mind, a truly laborious task lies ahead. Why
so, and what can be done about it? The discussion which follows
is addressed to these two questions. They will be considered in
the order stated.
I.
Our Peculiar Law of Perpetuities
A.
Caveats
In fairness, two concessions should be made at the outset.
1Excluding our statutes on accumulations and direct restraints on
alienation. Arguably, these are part of our perpetuities legislation, but
they are a separable part and we have enough to discuss without them.
*Asst. Professor of Law, Montana State University.
This is not a very precise term. As used herein, it means those statu-
tory and common law rules of the various states which limit the dura-
tion of indestructible trusts and future interests, either vested or con-
tingent, (and, collaterally, invalidate some present interests). It does
not. include restrictions on either accumulations or direct restraints on
alienation.
'Of course, like all generalizations, this one has its exceptions. Title
examiners and creditor's counsel may encounter perpetuities problems.
Sheean v. Michel, 6 Cal. 2d 324, 57 P. 2d 127 (1936). Or questions may
1
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First, perpetuities law in any of the United States' is bound to
be complicated. There is a basic reason why. The law of perpe-
tuities seeks to reconcile the conceded prerogative of the property
owner to control the disposition of his property with the obvious
interest of society in limiting the duration of that control. The
need for this reconciliation is clear enough. On the one hand,
common sense dictates that one should be permitted to make rea-
sonable provision for the support and advancement of his family.
On the other, all would agree that future generations ought
neither to be bound nor nurtured by the financial arrangements
of a remote and domineering ancestor.' But, practically speak-
ing, such a reconciliation cannot be effected without developing
some highly complex legal doctrine. This is so for at least two
reasons. One is that our law of property provides the estate
planner with a variety of devices for controlling the use of prop-
erty from generation to generation, almost indefinitely. To be
effective, the law of perpetuities must place limits upon the use
of all of these devices,' and this leads to complexity. Another
source of complexity is the need for specific rules in this area.
True, a noted English jurist of the 17th Century was willing to
limit the duration of ancestral control, ". . where-ever any
arise concerning the validity of real estate options; see Berg, Long-
Term Options and the Rule Against Perpetuities, 37 Calif. L. Rev. 1,
325, 419 (1949). And the Commissioner occasionally takes an interest.
Smith's Estate v. Comm'r. of Internal Revenue (C. A. 3d, 1944) 140 F.
2d 759.
'Caveat. No representations are made re Louisiana perpetuities doc-
trine which, being based upon the Civil Law, is somewhat unique, 6
American Law of Property § 25.88 (Whiteside ed., 1952). It would ap-
pear, however, that the Louisiana law of perpetuities is no model of
simplicity; see Oppenheim, Limitations and Uses of Louisiana Trusts,
27 Tulane L. Rev. 41 (1952).5These are, of course, merely some specific reasons for rendering proper-
ty freely alienable in the hands of successive generations, the so-called
public interest in alienability being the conventional justification for
the restrictions imposed by the law of perpetuities, 4 Restatement, Prop-
erty, Part I, Intro. Note (1944).
'Though in fact it does not. Possibilities of reverter and powers of
termination are not subject to the common law rule against perpetuities
in the United States, although there is some statutory regulation of
them; see 6 American Law of Property § 24.62 (Leach and Tudor eds.,
1952). Arguably, the exception of these interests is somewhat less im-
portant because they are reversionary; caveat, Brown v. Independent
Baptist Church of Woburn, 325 Mass. 645, 91 N.E. 2d 922 (1950), dis-
cussed in 6 American Law of Property, op. cit. supra, Case 95. And it
is at least theoretically possible to approach the effect of a long-term
family trust with a long-term insurance settlement which, arguably, in-
volves only contract rights against the insurer rather than property in-
terests and therefore is not subject to rules against perpetuities. Holmes
v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 288 N.Y. 106, 41 N.E. 2d 909
(1942) ; 6 American Law of Property § 24.58 (Leach and Tudor eds.,
1952).
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visible Inconvenience doth appear; . .. '" But after all, you can-
not tell your client that the Will you have prepared will hold
water unless it is found to be socially inconvenient by the
Supreme Court. Presumably, past generations of English and
American lawyers have taken the same view. In any event, a
good deal of detailed doctrine has been developed which distin-
guishes valid transfers from invalid ones with meticulous care
and complicates the law of perpetuities still further.
The second concession which should be made is this. In gen-
eral theory, our law of perpetuities is not peculiar. The heart of
our perpetuities system is contained in seventeen sections of the
Codes." These sections originated in New York.' They were en-
acted in California as a part of the Field Civil Code,' with some
important modifications, in 1872." In 1895, Montana enacted the
then-current California provisions with few changes." This New
York legislation was also adopted, with various alterations, in a
number of other states. ' The most conspicuous common feature
of these statutes, wherever adopted, is their prohibition of the
suspension of the absolute power of alienation for some period
of time." The Montana version of this prohibition is stated gen-
erally in two of our Code sections, as follows:
The absolute power of alienation cannot be suspend-
ed, by any limitation or condition whatever, for a longer
period than during the continuance of the lives of per-
'So said Lord Chancellor Nottingham in The Duke of Norfolk's Case,
3 Ch. Cas. 1, 49, 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (1682).
'Rev. Codes Mont. 1947 §§ 67-320, 67-321, 67-406, 67-407, 67-422, 67-511
through 67-518, 86-101, 86-105, 86-112 and 86-114.
'All of them except § 67-512 were originally derived from the New York
Revised Statutes of 1830. See Rev. Stat. (1830), pt. 2, c. 1, tit. 2, §§ 13,
15, 14, 41, 23, 16, 24, 17, 18, 20, 21, 45, 55, 63 and 65 respectively.
"Civil Code (New York, 1865). See §§ 186, 187, 201, 202, 216, 227
through 232, 234, 235, 274, 285, 295 and 298 respectively.
nThe history of the California legislation is summarized in 6 American
Law of Property 25.59 (Whiteside ed., 1952). Perhaps the most im-
portant modification was the substitution of lives in being for two lives
in being as the generally permitted period of suspension.
"The history of the Montana legislation is summarized in 6 American
Law of Property § 25.73 (Whiteside ed., 1952).
"Arizona, California, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota,
Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota and Wisconsin; the
District of Columbia also borrowed from the New York statutes; see 4
Restatement, Property, app. B, t. 1, para. 1 (1944). The Indiana
statutes were repealed in 1945, Ind. Acts (1945) c. 216, and those of
Michigan in 1949, Mich. Laws (1949) Act 38. The California and North
Dakota statutes have been radically revised, Cal. Stats. (1951) c. 1463;
Laws of North Dakota (1953) c. 274. For further discussion of the
statutes of these jurisdictions see pages 36-40, infra.
"Ranging from two lives in being in New York, Real Prop. L. § 42, Pers.
Prop. L. § 11, to lives in being and 30 years in Wisconsin, Wis. Stat.
(1953) §§ 230.14, 230.15.
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sons in being at the creation of the limitation or cond-
dition, except in the single case mentioned in section
67-513.'
Every future interest is void in its creation which, by
any possibility, may suspend the absolute power of
alienation for a longer period than is prescribed in this
chapter. Such power of alienation is suspended when
there are no persons in being by whom an absolute in-
terest in possession can be conveyed."
Principally upon the basis of this common feature, it is possible
to classify Montana as one of a number of states which have
copied the New York statutory rule against perpetuities."
B.
Peculiarities
But having conceded the foregoing, we need concede no more.
If our perpetuities law is not peculiar in general, it certainly is
in particular, for a variety of reasons.
1.
Little Law
One is the paucity of local law. The statutes provide us with
a bare skeleton and there are only five decisions of the Montana
Supreme Court to assist in construction." Most of our perpe-
'5Rev. Codes Mont. 1947 § 67-406; § 67-513, therein referred to, states a
limited exception to the permitted period of lives in being, as follows:
A contingent remainder in fee may be created on a prior re-
mainder in fee to take effect in the event that the person to
whom the first remainder is limited die under the age of
twenty-one years, or upon any other contingency by which the
estate of such persons may be determined before they attain
majority.
The New York version of this exception, contained in Real Prop. L § 42,
is discussed in, 6 American Law of Property § 25.17 (Whiteside ed.,
1952). The result reached by our Supreme Court in the case of In re
Murphy's Estate, 99 Mont. 114, 43 P. 2d 233 (1935) can be justified as
falling within this exception. See 4 Restatement, Property, app. c. B,
para. 62 (1944). The Montana court actually took the more doubtful
position that there was no suspension beyond lives in being, 99 Mont.
114, 124-26. For further discussion of the Murphy case, see notes 18,
56, infra.6Rev. Codes Mont. 1947 § 67-407.
17See 4 Restatment, Property, app. B, t. 4, para. 1 (1944) ; 6 American
Law of Property §§ 25.1, 25.4 (Whiteside ed., 1952), both of which
adopt this classification.
'In re Murphy's Estate, 99 Mont. 114, 43 P. 2d 233 (1935) appears to fall
within the exception to our general rule limiting permissable suspension
to lives in being which is discussed in note 15, supra. See also note 56,
infra. Hodgkiss v. Northland Petroleum Consolidated, 104 Mont. 328 at
pages 339-40, 67 P. 2d 811 (1937) appears to hold, with little discussion,
that business trusts are not subject to our statutory rule. Montana
Consolidated Mines Corp. v. O'Connell, 107 Mont. 273 at pages 281-82,
85 P. 2d 345 (1938) holds that a perpetual option of renewal In a min-
4
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tuities statutes have not been construed at all.' Even a synopsis
of the perpetuities problems upon which there is no Montana
authority is impracticable, though a number of them are revealed
in the discussion which follows.
2.
Unsettled Law
This problem, of course, is an inevitable correlative of the
first.
a.
To begin with, it is very possible that, in addition to our rule
against suspension of the absolute power of alienation, we have
some general rule restricting the creation of contingent interests
which do not suspend the absolute power of alienation at all."
Such an interest is created, for example, by the following trans-
fer: 0 conveys land to the City of X so long as the land is main-
tained by the city as a public park, but if the land ever ceases to
be so maintained, then over to 0 's son S and his heirs in fee sim-
ple. Clearly the absolute power of alienation, as defined in our
statutes, is not suspended by this transfer. The City of X and
S, or his successors, can at any time unite in a deed and convey
the land in fee; nonetheless, S's interest is clearly contingent.'
It was decided in New York a good many years ago that the
statutes of that state prohibited such a transfer." The New York
Court of Appeals took the position that a contingent interest was
eral lease does not violate our statutory rule. In re Hartwig's Estate,
119 Mont. 359, 175 P. 2d 178 (1946) holds that a trust to endure for a
period in gross of 10 years violates our statutory rule. And In re
Swayze's Estate, 120 Mont. 546, 191 P. 2d 322 (1948) holds that a
perpetual trust for the erection and maintenance of a hotel is not
charitable and hence violates our statutory rule. For a discussion of
the Swayze decision see Note, 23 Ind. L. J. 502 (1948). It will be ob-
served that the Murphy case is the only one of the five that involves a
long-term family trust. Accordingly, it is quite clear that any Montana
draftsman seeking to create such a trust must look well beyond local
authority for guidance.
'In fact, of the seventeen code sections listed in; note 8, supra, only five
of them, 67-406, 67-407, 67-422, 67-511 and 67-512 appear to have been
construed in perpetuities cases. Three others, §§ 86-101, 86-105 and
86-114, are trusts statutes which also have non-perpetuities functions,
and they have been construed or at least mentioned in non-perpetuities
cases: see Horsky v. McKennan, 53 Mont, 50 at page 57, 162 Pac. 376
(1916); Whitcomb v. Koechel, 117 Mont. 329 at page 333, 158 P. 2d 496
(1945); In re Strode's Estate, 118 Mont. 540, 167 P. 2d 579 (1946).
'Several of our specific statutory provisions refer to contingent as op-
posed to vested interests. Rev. Codes Mont. 1947 §§ 67-513, 67-514,
67-517.
2'It satisfies our statutory definition of a contingent future Interest,
Rev. Codes Mont. 1947 § 67-321, quoted on page 23, Infra, since the
event is uncertain.
'Walker v. Marcellus & O.L. Ry. Co., 226 N. Y. 347, 123 N.E. 736 (1919).
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void ab initio unless it was certain to vest within the period dur-
ing which the absolute power of alienation might lawfully be
suspended.' Were the Montana courts to follow this New York
rule, it would be held that a contingent interest, to be valid, must
be certain to vest, if at all, within lives in being. It is difficult
to predict whether our courts would so hold. Our statutes vary
in some particulars from those stressed by the New York court."
Further, this New York doctrine was repudiated by a California
appellate court at a time when the California perpetuities statutes
were, in relevant respects, analogous to the current Montana
statutes.'
However, Montana courts might hold our hypothetical con-
tingent interest invalid on the quite different ground that the
common law rule against perpetuities is in force in this state in
addition to our statutory rule. The common law rule is, at least
primarily," a rule prohibiting the creation of contingent interests
which may vest too remotely. The most widely accepted state-
ment of it is that of Professor Gray:
"No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not
later than twenty-one years after some life in being at
the creation of the interest. "'
Clearly, S's contingent interest under our hypothetical transfer
violates this rule. Hence it would be invalid. Some recent
cases in the California appellate courts are persuasive authority
23In re Wilcox, 194 N.Y. 288, 87 N.E. 497 (1909).
2AE.g., the measuring period under our statutes is lives in being rather
than two lives in being, and R.S. (1830) § 19, referred to by the New
York court as one of the sections justifying its conclusion, was omitted
from our code. Logically, these differences would appear to be ir-
relevant, but they could be seized upon as distinguishing features.
"
5In re Sahlender's Estate, 89 Cal. App. 2d 329, 201 P. 2d 69 (1948). Of
course, the California court repudiated the New York analysis in the
course of adopting another rule against remoteness of vesting, the com-
mon law rule against perpetuities. See note 29, infra.
'There is scholarly debate as to whether the common law rule against
perpetuities, or a related common law doctrine, limits the permissable
duration of Indestructible trusts. Cf. 2 Simes, Future Interests § 490
(1936) ; Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities §§ 1-4, 235-237.4 (4th ed.,
1942). It is said that the authorities favor the negative answer of
Gray's treatise. 6 American Law of Property §§ 24.1, 24.3, 24.67 (Leach
and Tudor eds., 1952). Doubtless to insure the existence of a rule re-
stricting the permissable duration of indestructible trusts, the drafts-
men of the recent California perpetuities revision included a provision
prohibiting suspension of the absolute power of alienation beyond lives
in being and 21 years by any sort of transfer. Cal. Civ. Code (Deering,
1949), 1953 Cum. Supp. § 715.1. For a critique of this California solu-
tion see note 133, infra.
'Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities § 201 (4th ed., 1942).
6
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for the view that the common law rule exists in Montana.' These
cases held that rule to exist in California, along with the Califor-
nia statutory rule against suspension of the absolute power of
alienation, and were based upon Constitutional and statutory pro-
visions similar to those presently found in Montana.'
If we do have some general rule restricting the duration of
contingent interests in this state, the importance of the distinc-
tion between contingent and vested interests is increased. Hence
it should be noted that we have also borrowed from New York,
via California, our statutory definitions of contingent and vested
future interests, viz:
A future interest is contingent whilst the person in
whom, or the event upon which, it is limited to take ef-
fect remains uncertain.'
A future interest is vested when there is a person in
being who would have a right, defeasible or indefeasible,
to the immediate possession of the property, upon the
ceasing of the intermediate or precedent interest.'
These sections appear to be unconstrued in Montana. But they
have engendered a great deal of litigation in New York for the
rather unforgivable reason that there are some future interests
which satisfy both definitions. '
b.
Secondly, the operation of our statutory rule against sus-
pension of the absolute power of alienation is uncertain in a
number of respects. In fact, the uncertainty is such that a
seemingly common-place sort of transfer can raise a host of un-
settled questions.
For example, suppose settlor S transfers income producing
real and personal property upon revocable trust to pay income
'In re Sahlender's Estate, 89 Cal. App. 2d 329, 201 P. 2d 69 (1948) ;
Dallapi v. Campbell, 45 Cal. App. 2d 541, 114 P. 2d 646 (1941) ; see 6
American Law of Property § 25.61 (Whiteside ed., 1952). Contra,
Lockyear v. Tucker, 69 Idaho 84, 203 P. 2d 380 (1949), (Apparently
counsel and the court were relying on outmoded California authority.)
'The California Constitutional provision seems innocuous enough at first
blush. "No perpetuities shall be allowed except for eleemosynary pur-
poses," A. XX § 9. But the California courts have seized upon it as
evidencing an intention to adopt the common law rule. In re Sah-
lender's Estate supra note 28 201 P. 2d 69 at pages 73-79. The Mon-
tana Constitutional provision seems substantially identical, "No perpe-
tuities shall be allowed, except for charitable purposes," A. XIX § 5.
' Rev. Codes Mont. 1947 § 67-321.
8 Id. § 67-322.
2E.g., a transfer of realty to A for life, remainder to the heirs of A. It
will be recalled that our statutes abolish the rule in Shelley's case, Rev.
Codes Mont. 1947 § 67-520. See Moore v. Littel, 41 N.Y. 66 (1869) ; 6
American Law of Property § 25.32 (Whiteside ed., 1952).
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to S for his life, and upon his death to pay income equally among
S's children who survive S, and upon the death of each such sur-
viving child to distribute a pro rata share of corpus per stirpes
among such child's then-surviving issue, or, in default of such
issue, per stirpes among the then-surviving issue of S's other chil-
dren. This set of facts raises at least the following debatable is-
sues.
(1)
When is this trust deemed to have been created for purposes
of applying our statutory rule? (If at the time of the transfer,
then our rule is violated because some portion of the trust might
continue during the lives of after-born children of S,' hence
there is at least partial invalidity. If at S's death, when his
power of revocation terminates," then there can be no violation
because any child of S can qualify as a life in being and the trust
is certain to terminate upon the death of the survivor of S's chil-
dren.) This question is frequently confused with a wholly dif-
ferent one, viz: whether the absolute power of alienation is sus-
pended by a revocable trust. The answer to the latter question
is clearly no.' But our statutory rule does not say that the ab-
solute power of alienation may be suspended during lives in
being at the date of the suspension. Rather, the statute permits
suspension during lives in being at the date of the transfer creat-
ing the suspension.'
Modern authority, applying the common law rule against
perpetuities, treats such a transfer as taking place when the pow-
er of revocation terminates so that any lives in being at the latter
date may be measuring lives.' On this analysis, as stated above,
"
T he possibility of suspension beyond the permitted period as distin-
guished from the probability of it, is sufficient to cause Invalidity. In
re Hartwig's Estate, 119 Mont. 359, 365, 175 P. 2d 178 (1946).
'Of course it could be terminated earlier by a release of the power.
"Equitable Trust Co. v. Pratt, 117 Misc. 708, 193 N.Y. Supp. 152 (1922);
Irving Trust Co. v. Hartmann, 8 N.Y.S. 2d 387 (Supreme Court, 1938);
Schenectady Trust Co. v. Emmons, 261 App. Div. 154, 25 N.Y.S. 2d 230
(1941) ; Bankers Trust Co. v. Topping, 180 Misc. 596, 41 N.Y.S. 2d 736
(Supreme Court, 1943) ; Chase Nat. Bank of City of New York v. Reed,
189 Misc. 694, 67 N.Y.S. 2d 290 (Supreme Court, 1946) ; In re Heller's
Trust, 115 N.Y.S. 2d 343 (Supreme Court, 1948) (dictum) ; City Bank
Farmers Trust Co. v. Cannon, 291 N.Y. 125, 51 N.E. 21 674 (1943) (dic-
tum) : Annot. 7 A.L.R. 2d 1089, 1094-96 (1949).
MRev. Codes Mont. 1947 § 67-406, quoted at pages 19-20, supra. It is easy
to confuse these questions. For some judges and writers who have done
so, see note 40, infra.
'Manufacturer's Life Ins. Co. v. Von Hamm-Young Co., 34 Hawaii 288
(1937); Ryan v. Ward, 192 Md. 342, 64 A. 2d 258, 7 A.L.R. 2d 1078
(1949); Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities § 524.1 (4th ed., 1942) ;
6 American Law of Property § 24.59 (Leach and Tudor eds., 1952) ; 4
Restatement, Property § 373 (1944).
8
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our hypothetical trust would be valid. Moreover, such a result
seems eminently sensible since, until the power of revocation
terminates, there can be no substantial interference with alien-
ability.
However, in Montana, as in New York and California,' the
path to this appealing conclusion is barred, prima facie, by ex-
press statutory language. Our statute reads:
The delivery of the grant, where a limitation, con-
dition, or future interest is created by grant, and the
death of the testator, where it is created by will, is to be
deemed the time of the creation of the limitation, con-
dition, or interest, within the meaning of this part of
the code.'
A literal application of this statute, of course, leads to the con-
clusion that our hypothetical trust was created at the time of the
original transfer. And, although judges and writers have occa-
sionally made general statements to the contrary,' no case has
been found which declines to comply with the statute. Indeed,
the holdings in New York have kept scrupulously within it."
There appears to be only one California case dealing with the
question, and in that case the California Supreme Court applied
the statute literally without even a suggestion of doubt."
"Real Prop. L. (N. Y.) § 64, Pers. Prop. L. (N. Y.) § 11; Cal. Civ. Code
(Deering, 1949) § 749.
'Rev. Code Mont. 1947 § 67-422.
'See In re Heller's Trust, 115 N.Y.S. 2d 343, 345 (Supreme Court, 1948)
(dictum) ; Annot. 7 A.L.R. 2d 1089, 1091 (1949). Two of the editors
of the American Law of Property appear to have been misled into a
citation of New York cases in support of the modern doctrine under the
common law rule. See 6 American Law of Property § 24.59, Case 92
and accompanying footnote 2 (Leach and Tudor eds., 1952). However,
their co-editor has been careful to avoid this error in discussing the New
York law. (Id. § 25.15 at pages 201, 202 and footnotes 9, 10 (Whiteside
ed., 1952). And the distinction is noted in Gray, The Rule Against
Perpetuities § 524.1, footnote 6 (4th ed., 1942).
"See cases cited in note 35, supra. The New York courts have, however,
been astute to avoid their statutes. Thus, if a revocable trust instru-
ment has been superceded by the substitution of a new instrument, it
has been held in several cases that lives of persons born after the
original creation of the trust, but prior to the date of substitution, are
in being for purposes of the New York statutory rule because the date
of substitution may be treated as the date of creation of the interests
in question. Schenectady Trust Co. v. Emmons, 261 App. Div. 154, 25
N.Y.S. 2d 230 (1941) ; Bankers Trust Co. v. Topping, 180 Misc. 596,
41 N.Y.S. 2d 736 (Supreme Court, 194) ; Chase National Bank of City
of New York v. Reed, 180 Misc. 694, 67 N.Y.S. 2d 290 (Supreme Court,
1946).
42Sheean v. Michel, 6 Cal. 2d 324, 57 P. 2d 127 (1936). The California
legislature may have sought to repudiate this decision in the course of
its 1951 perpetuities revision. Query, however, whether their statute
is aptly worded for the purpose?
... The period of time during which an Interest is destructi-
9
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Admittedly, such a conclusion runs contrary to common
sense. If the absolute power of alienation is not suspended until
the power of revocation terminates, what reason is there for re-
quiring a selection of measuring lives at an earlier date? Pos-
sibly for such reasons as this, the draftsmen of the Restatement
of Property appear to suggest that the New York rule parallels
the common law rule in this respect." And of course it can be
argued that the statute is but a codification of the common law
and ought to be construed with equal flexibility." At best, how-
ever, the Montana rule is in doubt.
(2)
Were it held that our trust was created, for perpetuities pur-
poses, at the time of the original transfer, we would face another,
and more complex, question, viz: how much of the transfer is in-
valid? (Although it is commonly said that any trust which sus-
pends the absolute power of alienation beyond the permitted
period is void," it is well settled in New York and California that
if the offending portion of a transfer can be excised without ex-
cessive distortion of the estate plan, the valid portions will be
permitted to stand.' A similar doctrine prevails under the com-
mon law rule.'7 ) Our general question of the degree of invalidity
resolves itself into a number of specific inquiries, as follows:
(a)
Are the life interests in income which are given to S's chil-
dren rendered inalienable by statute, so that the absolute power
of alienation of each child's life interest is suspended during his
lifetime? (If so, it is possible that a child of S who was born
ble pursuant to the uncontrolled volition and for the exclusive
personal benefit of the person having such a power of destruc-
tion is not to be included in determining the existence of a sus-
pension of the absolute power of alienation or the permissable
period for the vesting of an interest within the rule against
perpetuities. Cal. Stats. (1951) c. 1463 § 4, Cal. Civ. Code
(Deering, 1949), 1953 Cum. Supp. § 716. (Italics supplied).
434 Restatement, Property app., c. A, para. 14 (1944). Or it may be that
the draftsmen simply did not note the effect of the New York statutes
on this problem. If so, they are not alone. See note 40, supra.
"Though it is not altogether clear tha the draftsmen of the Field Civil
Code would agree. See Civil Code (N.Y., 1865), Intro., xxi through
xxviii.
'6 American Law of Property § 25.12 (Whiteside ed., 1952).
"New York: Chaplin, Suspension of the Power of Alienation §§ 528-30
(3rd ed., 1928) ; 6 American Law of Property § 25.28 (Whiteside ed.,
(1952). California: Estate of Van Wyck, 185 Cal. 49, 196 Pac. 50
(1921) ; Otto v. Union Nat. Bank of Pasadena, 38 Cal. 2d 233, 238 P.
2d 961 (1951) : 6 American Law of Property § 25.65 (Whiteside ed.,
1952).
'4 Restatement, Property, c. 28 Intro. Note, § 402 (1944).
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after the transfer might survive all persons in being at the time
of the transfer, thus suspending the absolute power of alienation
of his beneficial interest in the trust beyond lives in being at the
date of the transfer.) The answer to this question depends upon
whether our courts are willing to follow the New York construc-
tion of five of our code sections. The first two" limit the pur-
poses for which express trusts of real property may be created to
specified purposes, one of which is,
To receive the rents and profits of real property, and
pay them to or apply them to the use of any person,
whether ascertained at the time of the creation of the
trust or not, for himself or for his family, during the
life of such person, or for any shorter term, subject to
the rules of sections 67-502 to 67-611 ;
The third section provides that,
The beneficiary of a trust for the receipt of the rents
and profits of real property, or for the payment of an
annuity out of such rents and profits, cannot transfer or
in any manner dispose of his interest in such trust.'
The fourth section provides,
Except as hereinafter otherwise provided, every express
trust in real property, valid as such in its creation, vests
the whole estate in the trustees, subject only to the execu-
tion of the trust. The beneficiaries take no estate or in-
terest in the property, but may enforce the performance
of the trust."
And the fifth section provides,
Where a trust in relation to real property is expressed
in the instrument creating the estate, every transfer or
other act of the trustee, in contravention of the trust, is
absolutely void.'
In brief, the New York courts have analyzed their similar code
sections as follows. Every trust falling within these sections is a
spendthrift trust, the beneficiary being wholly without power to
alien his interest; furthermore, the trustee is without power to
join in a conveyance so as to terminate the trust. T~his being so,
every trust falling within these sections suspends the absolute
power of alienation, (unless someone possesses an unrestricted
ORev. Codes Mont. 1947 § § 86-101, 86-105.
'Id. § 86-105, 3.
-1d. § 86-112.
t Id. § 86-108.
-1d. § 86-114.
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power to revoke or terminate it), and, if it may endure beyond
the permitted period, it is void.' Our statutes, (as used to be
the case in New York) appear in the Chapter of the codes which
deals with trusts of real property. However, the New York courts
applied their statutes, by analogy, to trusts of personalty.' Were
the Montana courts to accept the New York analysis, it would fol-
low that the beneficial interest of any afterborn child of S in our
hypothetical trust would be void.' Were our courts to accept the
analysis as to trusts of real property and reject it as to trusts of
personalty, it would be necessary to face perplexing problems
when mixed trusts of realty and personalty were involved.'
5Chaplin, Suspension of the Power of Alienation §§ 55-85 (3rd ed.,
1928), and see cases cited in note 35, supra.
'See discussion in 2 Simes, Future Interests § 568 (1936).
Stringer v. Young, 191 N.Y. 157, 83 N.E. 690 (1908) ; Cochrane v. Schell,
140 N.Y. 516, 534, 35 N.E. 971 (1894) ; 6 American Law of Property
§ 25.14 (Whiteside ed., 1952).
5A good deal of confusion is interjected, at this point, by, the case of In
re Murphy's Estate, 99 Mont. 114, 43 P. 2d 233 (1935). In the Murphy
case, it was held that a residuary trust to pay income to grandchildren
until they should respectively attain the age of 21 did not unlawfully
suspend the absolute power of alienation. As noted above, (note 15,
supra) the court's result can be justified on the ground that the case
fell within the limited exception of § 67-513 of the codes, permitting
suspension for lives in being plus the actual minority of a beneficiary.
But the court did not take this position. Rather, the opinion states that
there was no suspension during the minorities of the grandchildren
following the death of their parent, because, after that event, the class
of grandchildren could not increase so that each grandchild took a
definite interest, which the court assumed to be alienable. 99 Mont.
114, 123-27. Despite the cases involving this estate which reached the
Montana Supreme Court (In re Estate of Murphy, 57 Mont. 273, 188
Pac. 146 (1919) ; In re Murphy's Estate, 99 Mont. 73, 43 P. 2d 230
(1935), in addition to the principal case) it is not clear whether the
corpus of the trust consisted entirely of personalty or of both realty
and personalty. To the extent that real estate was involved, the
Supreme Court's opinion must be regarded as suspect because of the
code sections which were not discussed therein. To the extent that per-
sonalty was involved, the court may have repudiated the New York
rule previously mentioned. However, one cannot be sure of this. The
New York decision upon which the Montana court relied, Tucker v.
Bishop, 16 N.Y. 402 (1857), was treated by the New York court as one
involving an outright gift of a legacy, payable in the future, rather
than a trust to pay income to beneficiaries until they attained a named
age and then to distribute corpus. It is clear that this latter sort of
gift does not, of itself, suspend the absolute power of alienation, 6
American Law of Property § 25.10 (Whiteside ed., 1952). Hence it
would appear that the whole question of suspension by statutory spend-
thrift trusts remains highly controversial in this State.
r
7E.g., assuming a mixed trust of realty and personalty, does the invalid-
ity of the trust as to the real estate require the invalidation of the en-
tire trust, or may it be held valid as to one type of asset and invalid as
to the other? Michigan and Minnesota cases have generally taken the
position that the entire trust is thereby rendered void. Rong v. Haller,
109 Minn. 191, 123 N.W. 471 (1909) ; In re Richards' Estate, 283 Mich.
485, 278 N.W. 657 (1938). Though one Michigan case suggested that a
12
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It seems likely that the Montana courts will follow New
York, at least as to real property trusts, likely but not certain.
After all, it seems somewhat incongruous that our statutes should
both suspend the absolute power of alienation of a trust bene-
ficiary's interest and simultaneously declare that such suspension
renders the trust for his benefit void.'
(b)
Assuming that the trust would be void as to any after-born
child of S in accordance with the New York doctrines just dis-
cussed, does this defect merely invalidate the trust as to such
after-born children, or is the entire trust void ? In order to avoid
complete invalidity, it is necessary to deal with the theoretically
distinct issues of separability and distortion.
At its extremes, the separability issue hinges upon the set-
tlor's intentions at the date of transfer. He could, if he wished,
create a single trust for several beneficiaries. Or he could, if he
wished, transfer property to a trustee and create several trusts by
the same indenture, the corpus of each consisting of an undivided
interest in the property so transferred.' Logically, no event sub-
sequent to the date of transfer, including questions of invalidity
arising subsequently, is relevant to this issue.
Conventionally, the issue of distortion is posterior to that of
separability, and arises only if separate trusts, some valid and
some invalid, are found to exist. In such cases, the inquiry is, in
the light of the settlor's general plan of disposition, as evidenced
by the instrument of transfer, and in the light of the determina-
tion that some valid and some invalid trusts have been created,
would the settlor prefer that the valid trusts be upheld, or that
the entire transfer be invalidated ?
(1)
Turning first to the issue of separability, it is obvious that,
in close cases, construction will be all-important. And at this
point we encounter a local anomaly which renders the Montana
law of separability highly unpredictable. The New York cases
go well beyond unbiased construction in seeking to hold trusts
severance might be possible if the real estate constituted a very minor
part of the trust res. Dodge v. Detroit Trust Co., 300 Mich. 575, 2 N.W.
2d 509, 518 (1942). See 6 American Law of Property §§ 25.37, 25.49
(Whiteside ed., 1952).
'See 2 Simes, Future Interests § 568, p. 462 (1936).
'In re Mount's Will, 185 N.Y. 162, 77 N.E. 999, 1001 (1906).
'In re Micheletti's Estate, 24 Cal. 2d 904, 151 P. 2d 833 (1944) ; In re
Lyons' Will, 271 N.Y. 204, 2 N.E. 2d 628 (1936) ; In re Mount's Will,
185 N.Y. 162, 77 N.E. 999 (1906) ; 4 Restatement, Property § 402 (1944);
2 Simes, Future Interests § 529 (1936).
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separable for perpetuities purposes.' In the language of Jus-
tice Cardozo, "The court struggles to preserve, and surrenders
to nothing short of obvious compulsion."' Indeed, it can be
argued that the New York courts are approaching the position
that trusts may be held separable unless separation would be
fruitless because elimination of the invalid trusts would so dis-
tort the settlor's plan of disposition as to require a holding that
the valid trusts must fall with them.' At the least, it is entirely
clear that the New York courts will not surrender to anything so
unsubstantial as the manifest intention of a settlor to create what,
as a matter of form, is a single trust for several beneficiaries
rather than several trusts. There are a number of New York
cases in which such trusts have been held separable."
Unfortunately, it is not at all clear that our Supreme Court
will accept these New York cases. As of this writing, the pre-
'See 6 American Law of Property §§ 25.24-28 (Whiteside ed., 1952) and
cases cited.
'In re Gallien, 247 N.Y. 195, 160 N.E. 8, 9 (1928).
""The will does not expressly provide that upon the death of the hus-
band the trust shall be divided into separate shares, but a direction
to do so will be implied from the direction to divide the income between
the daughters, and from the direction that on the death of a daughter
leaving issue the principal from which that daughter received income
shall be paid to her issue." In re Halsey's Will, 286 N.Y. 154, 36 N.E.
2d 91, 93 (1941). Is it not quite clear that the tests of separability
accepted by the New York court in this case impose virtually no limita-
tions upon separability? And see In re Horner's Will, 237 N.Y. 489,
143 N.E. 655 (1924). In Horner, Justice Cardozo found trusts for the
children of testator's son, created in paragraph Tenth of the will to be
separable and valid, while a trust for the benefit of children of testa-
tor's daughter, created in paragraph Ninth was held to be invalid. The
obvious difference between the provisions for these two classes of
grandchildren was that the children of the son who were to benefit were
all persons in being, while the trust for the children of the daughter
might have benefited after-borns. Yet the language of paragraphs
Ninth and Tenth were otherwise virtually indistinguishable, and Jus-
tice Cardozo had before him a prior New York case, In re Mount's Will,
185 N.Y. 162, 77 N.E. 999 (1906), in which a trust for children of a
nephew, including after-borns, was, found to be separable and valid as
to those in being at the testatrix' death. Justice Cardozo distinguished
the Mount case on a technical ground, (the absence of an express di-
rection for division of corpus into shares in Horner, 143 N.E. 655,
659-60) ; but the same defect did not prevent his Honor from upholding
the trust for the children of testator's son under paragraph Tenth, 143
N.E. 655, 656-58. Justice Cardozo's discussion of the trust for children
of the daughter under paragraph Ninth shows exclusive preoccupation
with the question of whether the provisions for the child in being could
be upheld without undue distortion of testator's plan of disposition.
Since the living child was very young, there was a real possibility of
after-borns, and it was concluded that undue distortion might result.
143 N.E. 655, 658-60..
"A number of such are discussed in 6 American Law of Property §§ 25.24-
28 (Whiteside ed., 1952).
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ponderant (and most recent) local authority endorses Professor
Gray's Spartan statement on construction,
"The Rule against Perpetuities is not a rule of construc-
tion, but a peremptory command of law. It is not, like
a rule of construction, a test, more or less artificial, to
determine intention. Its object is to defeat intention.
Therefore every provision in a will or settlement is to be
construed as if the Rule did not exist, and then to the
provision so construed the Rule is to be remorselessly
applied.'
Nor is much comfort to be found in Gray's acknowledgment, in a
passage following that above-quoted, that a preference for a valid
construction may be indulged if the instrument in question is,
". .. really ambiguous, and is fairly capable of two construc-
tions . . ."' We have already observed that a number of the
New York cases find separable trusts despite the literal form of
the instrument. Unless our Supreme Court will go further than
Gray's treatise, it is unlikely to approve these New York cases,
and, a fortiori, is unlikely to find separable trusts in the hypo-
thetical case which we are considering.
Of course, our Court might go further. There is some local
authority for a more liberal view.' And it can be argued, with
much force, that Gray's rule is inappropriate in Montana, it hav-
ing been formulated to apply to the common law rule against
perpetuities, which is conspicuously less restrictive than our
statutory rule. Furthermore, there is much dissent from Gray's
statement even under the common law rule.' And while it is
true that the liberal New York cases have arisen under a statu-
tory rule even more restrictive than ours,' our Court has recog-
'Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities § 629 (4th ed., 1942). See In re
Swayze's Estate, 120 Mont. 546, 550, 191 P. 2d 322 (1948) ; In re Mur-
phy's Estate, 99 Mont. 114, 124, 43 P. 2d 233 (1935). And in the one
case in which our Supreme Court appeared receptive to a slightly less
rigorous rule, the Court nonetheless found it impossible to save the
transfer by construction. In re Hartwig's Estate, 119 Mont. 359, 365-
66, 175 P. 2d 178 (1946).
"Gray, op. cit. supra § 633.
'Though it certainly is not very persuasive, In re Hartwig's Estate,
op. cit. supra, and can be reconciled with Gray's rule. Gray, op. cit.
supra § 633.
's2 Simes, Future Interests § 550 (1936) ; 4 Restatement, Property § 375
(1944) ; 6 American Law of Property § 24.45 (Leach and Tudor eds.,
1952) and cases cited.
'Suspension being generally limited to two lives in being, Real Prop. L.
§ 42, Pers. Prop. L. § 11.
15
Waterbury: Montana Perpetuities Legislation—A Plea for Reform
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1955
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
nized that New York cases are persuasive authority in construing
our statutes."
Let us now turn directly to our hypothetical case: Are the
income interests given to each of S's children who survive him
separable, or does the fact that after-born children may be in-
cluded require a holding that the interests of all children are in-
validI
The nature of the case against separability has already been
indicated. We must view the transaction from the creation of
the trust, ignore later events, and follow the literal language of
the instrument, without a preference for validity. When we do,
we are faced with the fact that there is no literal separation of
the transfer into separate trusts. Initially, S reserves a right to
income from the entire corpus for his life. Then he directs that,
at his death, the income be distributed equally among his then-
surviving children. There is nothing to suggest a division of the
corpus at all prior to the death of a child. S not having intended
to create separate trusts, he didn't. Hence no separability.
The case for separability is as follows. Admittedly, there is
no separation until S's death. But a number of New York cases
hold that a separation is effected upon the death of a life tenant
by language directing, at most, a purely verbal separation of the
corpus into shares at that time, (no separation for purposes of ad-
ministration is required.)'
In our hypothetical case, income is to be distributed equally
among S's surviving children, and at the death of each child a
pro rata share of corpus is to be released from the trust. Is this
not a sufficient compliance with the requirement of separation
into shares upon S's death? There is a decision of the New York
Court of Appeals which is squarely in point on this issue. It
says yes."2 The New York courts have been interpreting statutes
analogous to ours for over 100 years. We ought to be: guided by
"In re Murphy's Estate, 99 Mont. 114, 124-25, 43 P. 2d 233 (1935). It can
be argued, of course, that our statutory rule more closely parallels that
of California prior to the 1951 amendments in that state, Cal. Civ.
Code (Deering, 1949) §§ 715, 716, and that the California courts, while
favoring a valid construction, were less enthusiastic in that direction
than Newk York. See 6 American Law of Property § 25.64 (Whiteside
ed., 1952) and cases cited. But at least a partial answer is that the
California legislature thought their rule, thus applied, to be too restric-
tive, for the California statutes were liberalized further by amendment
in 1951. Cal. Stats. (1951) c. 1463.
'In re Halsey's Will, 286 N.Y. 154, 36 N.E. 2d 91 (1941) ; In re Buttner's
Will, 243 N.Y. 1, 152 N.E. 447 (1926) ; In re Horner's Will, 237 N. Y.
489, 143 N.E. 655 (1924) ; Schenectady Trust Co. v. Emmons, 261 App.
Div. 154, 25 N.Y.S. 2d 230 (1941).
"In re Halsey's Will, 286 N.Y. 154, 36 N.E. 2d 91 (1941).
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their experience. Hence the trusts for each of S's surviving chil-
dren are separable.
Which of these two analyses the Montana Supreme Court
would accept is, unfortunately, very uncertain indeed. In order
to reach the issue of distortion, however, we will assume that
separable trusts are found to have been created.
(2)
Turning now to the question of distortion, since the income
interesto given after-born children are invalid, would the desires
of S be better served by upholding the income interests of chil-
dren who were in being at the creation of the trust, or by in-
validating all, so as to treat all children equally? If the former,
it is well settled that the valid income interests may stand; other-
wise not." In fact, since the trust is revocable, this issue would
probably arise after S's death." At this time, it will be known
whether or not he had after-born children who survived him. If
he did, and if the result of invalidating the interests of all chil-
dren would be to permit them to take equally under S's will or by
intestacy, it would probably be held that the valid income inter-
ests failed with the invalid ones." But suppose that, in fact, S
had no surviving children born after the creation of the trust.
Were this the case, it would seem entirely clear that S would pre-
fer the valid income interests in his children who were in being
when the trust was created to stand. However, it is not clear that
we may consider fact§ occuring subsequent to the creation of the
trust in deciding this question. If we accept the language of the
cases, probably we cannot,"' leading to the ridiculous conclusion
7sEstate of Maltman, 195 Cal. 643, 234 Pac. 898 (1925) ; 4 Restatement,
Property, app. c. A, para. 70, § 402 (1944).7 4Though it could arise earlier if S's creditors sought to attack the trust.
See Sheean v. Michel, 6 Cal. 2d 324, 57 P. 2d 127 (19,36).
"
5 Benedict v. Webb, 98 N.Y. 460 (1885) ; 4 Restatement, Property § 402,
Comment a., Illustration 3 (1944).
7'In re Horner's Will, 237 N.Y. 489, 143 N.E. 655, 659 (1924) ; In re
Mount's Will, 185 N.Y. 162, 77 N.E. 999, 1001 (1906) ; Otto v. Union
Nat. Bank of Pasadena, 38 Cal. 2d 233, 238 P. 2d 961, 964 (1951).
Though the draftsmen of the Restatement are vague on this point. 4
Restatement, Property § 402, Comment a (1944). This question must
be distinguished from that of whether facts occuring subsequent to the
creation of an interest may be considered for purposes of deciding
whether the interest itself violates our statutory rule. The answer to
the latter question is clearly no. In re Hartwig's Estate, 119 Mont.
359, 365, 175 P. 2d 178 (1946) ; 6 American Law of Property § 25.15
(Whiteside ed., 1952). The question we are considering is whether an
interest which does not violate our statutory rule should be invalidated
because associated interests are admittedly invalid and permitting the
valid interest to stand may distort the settlor's plan of disposition.
Clearly a consideration of the facts existing when the issue of distortion
arises will assist in disposing of it.
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that S would have preferred that the income interests of children
who were in being at the creation of the trust be invalidated in
order to treat them in the same way as his after-born children
who do not in fact exist. But if we look to the results of the
cases, perhaps we can." Hence let us assume that S had no after-
born children who survived him and that the Montana Supreme
Court will uphold the income interests of children in being at
the creation of the trust. Our remaining question as to the extent
of invalidity concerns the remainder8 interests in corpus, limited
to the surviving issue of S's children.
(8)
The validity of the remainder interests is controlled by our
statutes which declare any future interest void in its creation if
it may suspend the absolute power of alienation beyond lives in
being." And, viewing the situation as of the creation of the trust,
an interest in remainder might vest in the surviving issue of an
after-born child of S subsequent to the termination of lives in
being at the creation of the trust. Thus, the interests limited to
such issue are clearly invalid. Whether this invalidity extends
to all remainder interests depends upon the doctrines of separa-
bility and distortion previously discussed in connection with the
income interests of S's children.
As to separability, conceding that a gift to a single class of
beneficiaries is entirely invalid if any of the members of the class
might take in violation of our statutory rule,' there may be an
7 Cf. In re Horner's Will, op. cit. supra, and In re Mount's Will, op. cit.
supra. In both cases, the New York Court of Appeals states that facts
occurring subsequent to the creation of the interests are irrelevant to
the issue of distortion. But in the Mount case, a trust for children of
a nephew, including after-borns, was found separable and valid as to
children in being at testatrix' death, and the court made much of the
extreme unlikelyhood that the nephew would in fact have after-born
children. 77 N.E. 999, 1001. While in the Horner case, which reached
the opposite result, there was evidently a real possibility of after-borns.
143 N.E. 655, 658-59.
7'By common law classification, the gifts over to the then-surviving is-
sue of S's other children upon the death of a child of S without issue
are executory interests. 2 Simes, Future Interests § 149 (1936). But
under our statutory definitions, they are remainders or conditional
limitations. Rev. Codes Mont. 1947 § 67-519.
'Rev. Codes Mont. 1947 §§ 67406, 67-407, set forth at pages 19-20 supra.
'The only decision to this effect which has been found is the Oklahoma
case of McLaughlin v. Yingling, 90 Okla. 159, 213 Pac. 552, 561-64
(1923), and the Oklahoma court was of the opinion that the local
statute against suspension of the absolute power of alienation was
declaratory of the common law rule against perpetuities. This rule
is well settled at common law however. 2 Simes, Future Interests
§§ 5.27-28 (1936) and cases cited. And it is well settled in New York
that a gift to a class which may include after-borns suspends the ab-
solute power of alienation. 6 American Law of Property § 25.8, and
cases cited in note 9 (Whiteside ed., 1952).
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invalid gift to one class of remaindermen and a valid gift to an-
other distinct class.' Here, we have separate classes of remain-
dermen, consisting of the issue of each surviving child of S.
Clearly, the remainder interests limited to the issue of any child
of S who was in being at the creation of the trust cannot suspend
the absolute power of alienation beyond lives in being because
they will become possessory, if at all, at the termination of a life
in being at the creation of the trust.'  Hence the remainders to
these classes are separable and valid ;' only those limited to the
issue of after-born children are void."
In view of this partial invalidity, would the plan of S be bet-
ter served by upholding the valid interests in corpus, or by in-
validating the whole? The New York cases seem to favor partial
validity, even where the distributions to grandchildren of the
creator of the trust may thereby be rendered unequal.' To get
on, let us assume that the Montana Court would so hold.
Final questions of separability and distortion are presented
by the gifts over upon the death of any child of S without issue to
the then-surviving issue of S's other children. While no New
York or California case precisely in point has been found, an
argument can be made for separability, as follows. Admittedly,
a gift over upon the death of any after-born child of S is void
because it might occur too remotely." However, a gift over upon
the death of any child of S in being at the creation of the trust
must vest in possession, if at all, within the permitted period,
though the gift over might be shared by a single class (consisting
of the then-surviving issue of all of S's children) which would
include the issue of after-born children. And, since each gift over
is of a separable share of corpus, it should follow that the valid
may be separated from the invalid. Lastly, in view of the deci-
sions mentioned in the preceding paragraph, it would seem that
the valid gifts over would be permitted to stand, on the basis
that such could be done without undue derangement of S's plan
of disposition.
812 Simes, op. cit. supra at page 404; 6 American Law of Property § 24.29
(Leach & Tudor eds., 1952). The problem of finding sub-classes in our
hypothetical situation is simpler than in the case posed by Messrs.
Leach and Tudor in their discussion, since we are assuming a deter-
mination that the children of S each took as the beneficiary of a
separate trust, rather than as a class.
'I.e., the life of their parent (or aunt or uncle), S's child.8' See the treatises listed in note 80, supra, and cases cited therein.
"Ibid.
' In re Horner's Will, 237 N.Y. 489, 143 N.E. 655 (1924) ; In re Lyons'
Will, 271 N.Y. 204, 2 N.E. 2d 628 (1936).
";n re Heard's Estate, 25 Cal, 2d 322, 153 P. 2d 553 (1944),
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C.
In Conclusion
A number of pages ago, it will be recalled, we undertook to
illustrate the unsettled state of the Montana law of perpetuities.
We have just finished discussing the second such illustration,
and therewith the plaintiff rests.
3.
Unique Law
It was observed at the outset' that Montana can be classified
as one of a number of states which have copied the New York
statutory rule against perpetuities. As a matter of genesis, this
is true. But insofar as the statement implies that decisions from
a number of other states offer a ready supply of authoritative in-
terpretations of our statutes, it is most misleading. In fact, deci-
sions on the same facts vary a good deal from state to state, for
the excellent reason that the statutes themselves vary. Indeed,
the statutes not only vary between states, they have been amended
from time to time in practically every state in which they have
been adopted. Hence, any perpetuities case from another state
which is cited in the Montana courts must be regarded as suspect
until the statutes of that state have been examined, (and they are
not always quoted in the opinions.) Furthermore, because of the
periodic amendments, it may be necessary to consult something
more than current statutes. It is probably a safe statement that
there is no law library in Montana, other than that of the Law
School, which is adequate for such research. Even the Law
School Library is not entirely so.
In addition, two other limitations on the utility of decisions
from these other states should be mentioned. First, there are
very few decisions from some of them. Secondly, judicial con-
struction of the statutes has varied a good deal from state to
state, and, particularly in the case of New York, local construc-
tion has also varied a great deal.
These points merit some illustration, though a comprehensive
discussion is impracticable. The other states to which we might
look for aid in construing our statutes, (because they have-or
had-some sort of prohibition against suspension of the absolute
power of alienation) are the following: Arizona; California;
Idaho; Indiana; Kentucky; Michigan; Minnesota; New York;
North Dakota; South Dakota; Oklahoma, and; Wisconsin.'
'Page 20 supra.
'4 Restatement, Property, app. c. B, t. 1, Para. 1 (1944).
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Some of these states can be eliminated at the outset. Arizona,
Idaho, and the Dakotas have too few decisions, and the statutes of
all but South Dakota differ from ours in important respects."
Indeed, a recent North Dakota amendment has adopted the com-
mon law permitted period of lives in being and 21 years.' Ken-
tucky has a single statute permitting suspension of the absolute
power of alienation for lives in being and 21 years and 10 months,
which appears to have been construed as declaratory of the com-
mon law rule.' Oklahoma can also be eliminated. The Oklahoma
statutes have varied materially from Montana's since 1919," while
the Oklahoma case law is quite confusing," some cases treating the
statutes as declaratory of the common law rule against perpe-
tuities."
Michigan and Indiana will be of no help in the future; both
states have repealed their statutes against suspension, (Indiana
in 1945, Michigan in 1949) and returned to the common law rule
against perpetuities." The Indiana cases arising under the earlier
statutes might be quite helpful, however. They were borrowed
from New York in 1843," but the generally permitted period of
suspension was lives in being as in Montana.' The Michigan sus-
pension statutes, on the other hand, varied markedly from ours.
They were adopted in 1846, the generally permitted period being
two lives in being." However, the Michigan statutes applied only
"See 6 American Law of Property §§ 25.58, 25.67, 25.74-76, 25.82. (White-
side ed., 1952).
'Laws of North Dakota (1953) ch. 274. It may be noted in passing that
this statute contains a rather glaring defect. Literally, it permits sus-
pension of the absolute power of alienation for lives in being and 21
years, "Except in the single case mentioned in section 47-0413 ... "
N.D. Rev. Code of 1943 § 47-0413 is identical, (one comma excepted)
to Rev. Codes Mont. 1947 § 67-513, quoted in note 15 supra, and, in some
situations, permits such suspension for lives in being and an actual
minority. The reconciliation of these statutes is somewhat difficult to
say the least.
"See 6 American Law of Property § 25.87 (Whiteside ed., 1952).
'In that year, a statute was enacted permitting trusts of real or personal
property to endure for lives in being or 21 years. Okla. Laws (1919)
c. 16 § 2. In 1941, the Oklahoma legislature further amended their
statutes to permit suspension by a trust during lives in being and 21
years. Okla. Stat. Anno. t. 60 § 175.47.
"See Browder, Perpetuities in Oklahoma, 6 Okla. L. Rev. 1 (1953).
"E.g., McLaughlin v. Yingling, 90 Okla. 159, 213 Pac. 552 (1923) ; Walk-
er's Estate, 179 Okla. 442, 66 P. 2d 88 (1937). These cases, and others,
are discussed in Browder, op. cit. supra, at 7-18, 20-24.
'Ind. Acts (1945) c. 216; Mich. Laws (1949) Act 38.
"6 American Law of Property § 25.69 (Whiteside ed., 1952).
"Ibid.
"Mich. Rev. Stat. (1846) c. 62 §§ 14-21, 23.
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to real property and chattels real.' The common law rule re-
mained in force as to chattels personal.'
The statutes of the remaining states merit individual atten-
tion. A few of the more conspicuous differences between these
statutes and our own are noted below, together with some com-
ments on interpretation.
a.
California
Our statutes were originally borrowed from California in
1895,' hence we might expect to make good use of California case
law. However, 1951 amendments to the California statutes have
substantially altered the law of perpetuities in that state.' The
old sections on the permitted period of suspension were repealed,'
and a new section was enacted to permit suspension during lives
in being and 21 years.' Another new section adopts the common
law rule.' Hence future California decisions will be based upon
statutes which vary markedly from our own. Furthermore, prior
to 1951, the California statutes had been altered a good deal. In
1874, the statute which provides that any trust to apply the rents
and profits of land is a spendthrift trust was amended; since
that date, the statute has merely permitted the draftsman to in-
clude spendthrift provisions.' In 1917, the generally permissable
period was altered from lives in being to lives in being or 25
years.' Hence even the old California cases are not necessarily
applicable.
b.
Minnesota
The generally permitted period of suspension is two lives in
being,' and the statutes apply only to transfers of real property
"Ibid.
1"'Michigan Trust Co. v. Baker, 226 Mich. 72, 196 N.W. 976 (1924).
"'Civ. Code (Mont.) 1895 §§ 1115, 1116, 1150, 1151, 1191, 1219-26, 1310,
1314, 1321, 1323.
1"'Cal. Stats. (1951) c. 1463. For a discussion of these statutes, see
Fraser and Sammis, The California Rules Against Restraints on Aliena-
tion, Suspension of the Absolute Power of Alienation, and Perpetuities,
4 Hastings L. J. 101 (1953).
"-Id. § 7.
"'Id. § 1.
-Id. § 2.
"'6Cal. Civ. Code (Deering, 1949) § 867; 6 American Law of Property
§ 25.62 (Whiteside ed., 1952). This seemingly innocuous distinction has
sufficed to render the California law on suspension by an indestructible
trust somewhat uncertain. See Otto v. Union Nat. Bank of Pasadena,
38 Cal. 2d 233, 238 P. 2d 961 (1951), noted in 41 Calif. L. Rev. 549
(1953).
"oCal. Civ Code (Deering, 1949) § 715; 6 American Law of Property, op.
cit. supra, § 25.59.
'uMinn, $tMts. (1953) § 500.13.
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and chattels real, the common law rule being in force with respect
to chattels personal.' Furthermore, the Minnesota courts have
held, contrary to our statute,"° that a power to sell trust property
and reinvest the proceeds prevents suspension of the absolute
power of alienation.'
c.
New York
The generally permitted period of suspension is two lives in
being,"' and this difference, while it would appear to be compre-
hensible enough, has a tendency to cause trouble."' New York
now has an express provision rendering beneficial interests in
trusts of personalty inalienable."' The New York decisions run
the gambit from a most rigorous enforcement of their statutes,
(immediately after their enactment in 1830') to the current very
lenient construction of challenged transfers." We have already
observed that the Montana cases are out of line with current New
York tenets of construction."'
d.
Wisconsin
The generally permitted period of suspension was originally
two lives in being,' later modified to two lives in being and 21
years,' later modified to lives in being and 30 years.' At the
date of the last amendment, 1927, the statute was broadened to
cover personalty as well as realty.' Thus the permitted period
in Wisconsin is longer than in any other state.
It will thus be seen that the job of deciding whether deci-
sions from other jurisdictions are applicable in Montana is no
'1In re Tower's Estate, 49 Minn. 371, 52 N.W. 27 (1892).
"'Rev. Codes Mont. 1947 § 67-512. But cf. Hodgkins v. Northland Petro-
leum Consolidated, 104 Mont. 328, 339, 67 P. 2d 811 (1937).
'Atwood v. Holmes, 224 Minn. 157, 28 N.W. 2d 188 (1947).
"'Real Prop. L. (N.Y.) § 42; Pers. Prop. L. (N.Y.) § 11.
'A great many of the New York cases involve trusts for the benefit of
more than two ascertained persons, and any such trust would, of course,
be valid under our statutes. Further, one can never be quite sure
whether New York liberal construction, designed to avoid invalidity
under the two-lives rule, is applicable where after-borns are involved.
See, e.g., In re Horner's Will, 237 N.Y. 489, 143 N.E. 655 (1924), dis-
cussed in note 63 supra.
"Pers. Prop. L. (N.Y.) § 15.
" Coster v. Lorillard, 14 Wend. 265 (N.Y., 1835) ; Hawley v. James, 16
W"end. 61 (N.Y., 1836).
".See discussion at pages 29-30 supra, and cases cited.
"'Pages 30-31 supra.
"'6 American Law of Property § 25.57 (Whiteside ed., 1952).
1"'Ibid.
'The current provision. Wis. Stats. (1953) § 230.15.
'Wis. Stats. (1925) c. 4. The current provision appears in Wis. Stats.
(1953) § 230.14.
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mean task, and that the outlook for the future is no brighter.
The current trend in the states which have some version of the
New York statutory rule is toward its abolition in favor of the
common law rule against perpetuities,' or drastic amendments
which look in the same direction.'
Finally, it should be observed that the various treatises do
not offer much assistance. They contain only limited discussions
of Montana law,' if they discuss it at all,' and are prone to such
statements as the following:
"The statutes of Arizona, California, Idaho, Indiana,
Kentucky, Montana, North and South Dakota, and Okla-
homa, all deal-in some sense-with 'suspension of the
absolute power of alienation,' . . . This book deals with
the law of New York, but many of the principles dis-
cussed have a bearing, and many of the New York cases
cited are of value, under the laws of all the States men-
tioned, . . ."'
"Thus, the general outlines of the statutory rule against
suspension of the power of alienation, as indicated in the
decisions discussed above, follow closely the California
interpretation except that Montana does not permit the
use of a period in gross. It may be assumed that the
California and New York decisions will be influential
in the future development of the rule in Montana."'
(Italics supplied.)
e.
In Conclusion
Of course, the foregoing does not mean that our law of perpe-
tuities is unique in the absolute sense; decisions from these other
states can furnish invaluable assistance in construing our statutes.
But it is clear that our statutes are unique enough to make the
search for this assistance a tricky business, impracticable without
an extensive library. And it is also clear that this uniqueness is
magnified by the lack of a comprehensive textual statement of
our statutory rule.' Many, many hours must be spent to achieve
Ind. Acts (1945) c. 216; Mich. Laws (1949) Act 38.
'Cal. Stats. (1951) c. 1463; Laws N.D. (1953) c. 274.
...4 Restatement, Property, app. c. B, para. 62 (1944) ; 6 American Law
of Property § 25.73 (Whiteside ed., 1952).
'Chaplin, Suspension of the Power of Alienation, (3rd ed., 1928), ap-
parently the most recent treatise devoted wholly to the statutory sys-
tem, does not.MId. § 26.
'6 American Law of Property, op. cit. supra, § 25.73.
'"There are several extensive discussions of the New York system. 4 Re-
statement, Property, app. c. A (1944) ; 6 American Law of Property, op.
cit. supra, Part 25, Subpart I, c. 2-5; Chaplin, op. cit. supra.
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orientation. Yet, if they axe not spent, grave errors are a moral
certainty.
4.
Summary
The case against our statutory rule against perpetuities can
be stated very simply. We have only a little local law, leaving
many unsettled questions, and it is difficult to find the answers
in treatises, or in decisions from other states. Furthermore, the
situation is unlikely to improve. Current legislation elsewhere
is rendering our statutes more and more unique. Research under
our statutory rule is, increasingly, an inquiry into the outmoded
law of other jurisdictions. And a sufficient increase in local
litigation to make recourse to foreign law unnecessary is not in
prospect. It is for these reasons that Montana practitioners who
seek a working knowledge of our law of perpetuities are entitled
to our sympathy.
II.
And What Can Be Done About It?
The remedy is certainly not obscure. Our statutory perpe-
tuities systema ought to be discarded if a more workable sub-
stitute can be found. And it seems clear that there is a more
workable substitute, viz: the common law rule against perpe-
tuities.
A.
Advantages of the Common Law Rule
If the common law rule were adopted in Montana, we would
only lose the benefit of a handful of local decisions, while we
would gain a system that is in force, without substantial statutory
modification, in nearly three-fourths of the United States.9 This
means thav an ample supply of case law from other jurisdictions
would be available to the Montana practitioner. Furthermore, he
would have ready access to the law, for there are a number of ex-
cellent treatises which deal exhaustively with the common law
rule,' plus a much larger number of articles in the legal journals.
132 such states are listed in 4 Restatement, Property, Part I., Intro. Note
at 2133-35. To this list should be added Indiana and Michigan which
have since enacted statutes restoring the common law rule. But Penn-
sylvania and Massachusetts must be subtracted, for they have under-
taken substantial statutory modification of the common law rule. The
Pennsylvania statutes, enacted in 1947, are Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon,
perm. ed.) t. 20 §§ 301.4, 301.5. See Comment, 48 Mich. L. Rev. 1158, 1166
et. seq. (1950). The Massachusetts statutes, enacted in 1954, are 6'Ann.
L. Mass. c. 184A.
'mGray, The Rule Against Perpetuities (4th ed., 1942) ; 4 Restatement,
Property, Part I (1944) ; 2 Simes, Future Interests, c. 30, 31 (1936) ; 6
American Law of Property, Part 24 (Leach and Tudor eds., 1952).
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It can be argued, of course, that there is not the uniformity
in decisions applying the common law rule which the foregoing
implies. It is true that there is some diversity in the cases, but
certainly less in this area of the common law than in most others.
Further, it is much easier to cope with a unique decision from
another state than with unique local statutes, the literal language
of which is backed by constitutional premises regarding separa-
tioA of powers.
Another advantage of the common law rule is that it is less
restrictive, and hence easier to work with, than our statutes. For
example, the hypothetical case with which we struggled, from
pages 23 to 35 of this discussion would be perfectly valid under
the common law rule.'
This is not to say, of course, that the common law rule is
without its critics. There are some articles in the current litera-
ture which are most critical of it." But the burden of these
articles is that the common law rule is needlessly restrictive, and
our statutory rule is still more so. Indeed, the principal antagonist
of the common law rule, Professor Leach of Harvard Law School,
is even more vehemently opposed to the New York statutory sys-
tem.' Finally, the critics of the common law rule nonetheless
accept it as the basis for the perpetuities systems which they pro-
pose. No one is suggesting that the ideal can be created with our
statutory system as a model.'
B.
Mechanics
Two questions remain. Which of our statutes should be re-
pealed? And how does one go about adopting the common law
rule against perpetuities ?
To dispose of the last first, the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws has promulgated a model
statute, designed to adopt the common law rule against perpe-
"See authorities cited in note 37 supra.
'Leach, The Rule against Perpetuities and Gifts to Classes, 51 Harv. L.
Rev. 1329 (1938) ; Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's
Reign of Terror, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 721 (1952) ; Tudor, Absolute certainty
of Vesting under the Rule against Perpetuities-a self-discredited relic,
34 Bost. Univ. L. Rev. 129 (1954).
'Leach, The Rule Against Perpetuities and the Indiana Perpetuities
Statute, 15 Ind. L. J. 261 (1940).
'For a critique of the recent California statutes, which bring the Cali-
fornia statutory rule much closer to the common law, see Fraser and
Sammis, The California Rules Against Restraints on Alienation, Sus-
pension of the Absolute Power of Alienation, and Perpetuities, 4 Has-
tings L. J. 101 (1953). The recommendation of the writers: repeal of
the balance of the California statutes and a complete return to the
common law rule. Id. at 116-17.
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tuities as it has developed in the United States.' This statute
has already been adopted in Wyoming' and California.'
Turning to the question of repeal, the following code sections
are integral parts of our statutory system, and clearly should be
eliminated: 67-406; 67-407, and; 67-511 through 67-519. In ad-
dition, the conflicting definitions of contingent and vested inter-
ests in sections 67-320 and 67-321 must be dealt with. The Min-
nesota remedy was omission of the latter,' and that would seem
to be an adequate solution. Finally, our statutory provisions
limiting the purposes for which trusts of real property may be
created will serve no useful purposes in the absence of our statu-
tory rule against perpetuities. And it seems senseless to restrict
the purposes of trusts of realty while permitting, as our codes do,
trusts of personal property, ".. . for any purpose for which a
contract may lawfully be made, ... "' These restrictions only
create traps for the unwary; indeed, they have already forced
our Supreme Court to labor manfully, against adverse California
authority, to save one testator's trust from invalidity. ' Accord-
ingly, it is submitted that sections 86-101 and 86-105 ought also
to be repealed, and a provision substituted which will permit the
creation of trusts of real and personal property for the same pur-
poses.
III.
Conclusion
Panaceas from the cloister have traditionally been viewed
with some suspicion by law students, lawyers and legislators alike.
The suggestions herein made must bear that cross. Nonetheless,
it is believed that the repeal of our statutory perpetuities system,
and the substitution of the common law rule as suggested herein,
would be a real service to Montana lawyers, and to their clients
as well.
159A Uniform Laws Anno. at 262. Section 1 is as follows:
No interest in real or personal property shall be good unless
it must vest not later than twenty-one years after some life in
being at the creation of the interest and any period of gesta-
tion' involved in the situation to which the limitation applies.
The lives selected to govern the time of vesting must not be so
numerous nor so situated that evidence of their deaths is
likely to be unreasonably difficult to obtain. It is intended by
the enactment of this statute to make effective in this state
the American common law rule against perpetuities.
'8'Wyo. Laws (1949) c. 92.
'Cal. Stats. (1951) c. 1463 § 2. However, California still retains many
features of the statutory system. See discussion at page 38 supra, note
134, supra.
lmMinn. Stats. (1953) § 500.12.
u*Rev. Codes Mont. 1947 § 86-206.
"'See In re Strode's Estate, 118 Mont. 540, 167 P. 2d 579 (1946).
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